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Analyzing Refusal-to-Deal Cases Under Brooke 
Group’s Predatory Pricing Test: The Tenth Circuit 
Misses the Mark in Christy Sports, LLC v. Deer Valley 
Resort Co. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Christy Sports, LLC v. Deer Valley Resort Co., the Tenth 
Circuit held that Deer Valley Resort Co. (“Deer Valley”) did not 
have a duty to deal with Christy Sports, LLC (“Christy Sports”), a 
snow ski rental company, and that it did not violate § 2 of the 
Sherman Act1 (“§ 2”) when it began to exercise a restrictive 
covenant after many years of non-enforcement.2 The Christy Sports 
court confronted the issue of whether Deer Valley, in light of 
antitrust law, could lawfully exercise its land sale agreement’s 
restrictive covenant.3 Ultimately, the court allowed Deer Valley to 
terminate its working relationship with Christy Sports even though 
such action would likely result in Deer Valley obtaining monopoly 
power in renting skis at the resort.4  
Relying on earlier Tenth Circuit and United States Supreme 
Court decisions, the Tenth Circuit held that Deer Valley and Christy 
Sports did not enjoy a relationship sufficient to bind Deer Valley to 
continue dealing with Christy Sports. The decision attempted to 
draw the boundaries for § 2 refusal-to-deal monopolization claims5 
based on a business relationship rule.6 Rather than using the hard-to-
follow business relationship rule, however, the Tenth Circuit should 
have employed the tried and proven predatory pricing analysis as 
 
 1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2006); see Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 
458 (1993) (reasoning that the purpose of the Sherman Act is to protect the public from 
unfair business practices and antitrust violations).  
 2. Christy Sports, LLC v. Deer Valley Resort Co., 555 F.3d 1188 (10th Cir. 2009). 
 3. Id. at 1190. 
 4. See id. 
 5. Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2006) (making monopolizing or attempting to 
monopolize illegal). 
 6. Recent United States Supreme Court cases have left the boundaries in this area of 
law less than clear. See infra Part III.B. 
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used in the Unites States Supreme Court case of Brooke Group Ltd. v. 
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.7 
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Utah’s claim to being the home of the “greatest snow on earth”8 
is supported by the number of skiers who travel to Utah to enjoy the 
state’s pristine, snowy mountain slopes.9 Deer Valley is one of three 
large ski resorts in the world-renowned skiing haven of Park City, 
Utah.10 Most of Deer Valley’s patrons are destination skiers; they fly 
into Salt Lake City and take a shuttle to the resort where they lodge 
and ski down Deer Valley’s slopes.11 
In 1990, Deer Valley sold a parcel of commercial property in its 
up-scale, mid-mountain village “subject to a restrictive covenant that 
prohibited use of the property for . . . ski rental . . . purposes without 
[Deer Valley’s] express written consent.”12 The buyers erected a 
commercial building at the mid-mountain village and leased space in 
the building to Bulrich Corporation (“Bulrich”).13 In accord with 
the restrictive covenant, Bulrich’s lease agreement initially prohibited 
using the space for renting skis.14 One year later, Deer Valley granted 
Bulrich permission to rent skis in return for 15% of the revenues.15 In 
1994, Bulrich merged with another company to form Christy 
Sports.16 Christy Sports continued to rent skis at the mid-mountain 
village until 2005.17 However, in 1995, for reasons unknown at the 
time of the case, Christy Sports discontinued paying Deer Valley 15% 
of the rental revenues as previously agreed upon.18 
In 2005, Deer Valley opened its own ski rental facility at the 
mid-mountain village; Deer Valley notified Christy Sports that the 
 
 7. Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 222–28 
(1993). 
 8. Ski Utah Home Page, http://www.skiutah.com (last visited Feb. 15, 2010). 
 9. See Christy Sports, 555 F.3d at 1190. 
 10. Id.; Park City Tourism Page, http://www.utah.com/parkcity/ (last visited Feb. 15, 
2010). 
 11. Christy Sports, 555 F.3d at 1190. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. at 1191. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
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restrictive covenant would be enforced and Christy Sports would no 
longer be allowed to rent skis at the mid-mountain location.19 By 
exercising the restrictive covenant, Deer Valley positioned itself not 
only as the sole purveyor of ski rentals at the mid-mountain village, 
but at the entire resort.20 By eliminating the ski rental competition 
from within its resort, Deer Valley left destination skiers “with few 
choices: they [could] carry unwieldy ski equipment onto the plane, 
take a shuttle into Park City and hunt for cheaper ski rentals in town, 
or rent from the more conveniently located [Deer Valley] 
location.”21  
Christy Sports filed a complaint, arguing that Deer Valley’s 
exercise of the restrictive covenant was anticompetitive and would 
result in a monopoly for Deer Valley in which it could charge 
destination skiers artificially inflated prices for ski rentals.22 Christy 
Sports argued that consumers would not only face increased prices, 
but also decreased selection.23 Christy Sports’ antitrust claims, based 
on § 2 of the Sherman Act,24 were dismissed, however, by the district 
court after Deer Valley filed a 12(b)(6) motion25 for “failure to state 
a claim upon which relief can be granted.”26 
III. SIGNIFICANT LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The Tenth Circuit used precedent regarding two closely related 
antitrust concepts to set the background for their decision: restrictive 
covenants and refusal to deal. Restrictive covenants are artificial 
barriers in the free market that produce limits on competition and, at 
the same time, are catalysts that pave the way for market entrants 
which, ironically, increases competition.27 Refusal-to-deal claims arise 
in the rare instance where a company has a legal duty to cooperate 
 
 19. Id.  
 20. Id. There was a trivial exception to Deer Valley’s monopoly: one lodge at the resort 
offered ski rentals exclusively to its own lodgers. Id. 
 21. Id.  
 22. Id.  
 23. Id. Christy Sports accused Deer Valley of either monopolizing or attempting to 
monopolize the ski rental market at the resort or alternatively at the mid-mountain village. Id. 
 24. Section 2 prohibits monopolizing or attempting to monopolize “any part of the 
trade or commerce among the several States.” 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). 
 25. Christy Sports, 555 F.3d at 1191. 
 26. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). 
 27. See Christy Sports, 555 F.3d 1188; Drury Inn-Colo. Springs v. Olive Co., 878 F.2d 
340 (10th Cir. 1989). 
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with a competitor instead of simply competing in the free market as 
companies usually do; breaching such a duty may violate antitrust 
principles and result in a refusal-to-deal claim.28 
A. Restrictive Covenants 
In dismissing Christy Sports’ claim, the district court relied 
principally on a single Tenth Circuit case, Drury Inn-Colorado 
Springs v. Olive Co.29 In Drury Inn, a motel chain purchased land on 
which it intended to build and operate a motel.30 The motel chain 
insisted that the seller attach a restrictive covenant to the 
neighboring lots, also owned by the seller, so as to prevent anyone 
purchasing the land from building a competing motel within close 
proximity to its own.31 The court held that the restrictive covenant 
did not violate the Sherman Act.32 The restrictive covenant, in all 
probability, induced Drury Inn to enter the market, which bolstered 
competition. Much like a valid covenant not to compete, the 
restrictive covenant in Drury Inn was limited in time and geographic 
scope.33 The restrictive covenant provided the bargained-for 
inducement required by Drury Inn to purchase the land and increase 
competition in the motel industry.  
B. Refusal to Deal 
In rare situations, refusing to deal with another is a § 2 violation; 
such situations are exceptions to the notion that businesses are not 
generally obligated to assist their competition.34 One such situation, 
discussed at length in Christy Sports, arose in Aspen Skiing Co. v. 
 
 28. See Christy Sports, 555 F.3d 1188; Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing 
Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985). 
 29. Christy Sports, 555 F.3d at 1195–96. 
 30. Drury Inn, 878 F.2d at 341. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at 341–42. The restrictive covenant was limited to two and a half years and the 
neighboring thirteen acres. Id. at 342; see 6 SAMUEL WILLISTON, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS 
§ 13:4 (Richard A. Lord, 4th ed. 1995). Restrictive covenants, like covenants not to compete, 
are valid when their limiting effect is “no broader than is necessary for the protection of the 
buyer.” Id.  
 34. See Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985) 
(illustrating that when such situations arise, they violate section 2 of the Sherman Act). The 
fact that Aspen and the subject of this Note both involve winter sports is happenstance.  
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Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp.,35 a case heard by the United States 
Supreme Court. Of the four major down-hill skiing facilities in 
Aspen, Colorado, three were owned by a single company (“the 
larger owner”).36 For many years, skiing patrons visiting Aspen had 
the option of purchasing an All-Aspen ski pass, a cooperative effort 
by the owners of the facilities allowing skiers the flexibility to ski at 
any of the Aspen resorts over a limited period of time.37 The facility 
owners received revenues based on the number of All-Aspen ski 
tickets redeemed by their respective facility.38 When the single-facility 
owner (“the smaller owner”) refused to accept a predetermined 
percentage of the revenues from the All-Aspen ski pass, which would 
have been much less than the single facility’s average revenue from 
the pass, the larger owner discontinued issuing or accepting the All-
Aspen ski pass and began a program that only included the larger 
owner’s facilities.39 Because consumers valued the option of choosing 
among the four facilities, the smaller owner sold vouchers to the 
larger owner’s facilities which were redeemable for their regular retail 
price.40 The larger owner refused to accept the vouchers.41 Refusing 
the vouchers was detrimental to the smaller owner’s viability because 
skiers placed such a high value on the flexibility to choose among the 
Aspen facilities.  
The Supreme Court held that the larger owner was 
monopolizing the Aspen down-hill skiing market.42 The Court held 
that two owners had engaged in a business relationship that required 
further dealing, and one party could not choose to discontinue their 
dealing with the other. The Court was especially concerned that the 
larger owner refused to accept the vouchers that were redeemable for 
retail price of admittance to the larger owner’s facilities.43 Refusing 
the vouchers indicated that the larger owner was willing to forego 
profits in the short-term to eliminate the smaller owner from the 
market in hopes to enjoy monopoly pricing in the future.44 
 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 589–90. 
 37. Id. at 590. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 592–93. 
 40. Id. at 593–94. 
 41. Id. at 594. 
 42. Id. at 608–11. 
 43. Id. at 603–05. 
 44. Id. at 608–11. 
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The Supreme Court limited the duty to deal holding in Aspen 
Skiing by its decision in Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices 
of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP.45 Trinko strengthened the nearly 
universally-assumed proposition that companies do not generally 
have an obligation to assist their competitors and limited the Aspen 
exception to its facts.46 
In Trinko, a telecommunications company, Verizon, was the only 
company with the needed infrastructure to provide certain 
telecommunication services to the state of New York.47 To 
encourage increased competition in the telecommunication industry, 
Congress passed the Telecommunications Act.48 The 
Telecommunications Act required Verizon to allow other companies 
access to its infrastructure so as to provide consumers with options 
from which to choose their telecommunications service provider.49 
The Act included a savings clause, which stated that aside from what 
the Act enumerated, all antitrust issues should be considered in 
regular antitrust form, without regard to the Telecommunications 
Act.50 
Verizon was accused of failing to allow its competitors access to 
its infrastructure, as required under the Telecommunications Act, 
and consequently, preventing its competitors from providing 
customers with uninterrupted telephone service.51 In addition to 
claims of violating the Telecommunications Act, Verizon’s 
competitors brought a monopolization claim under § 2, alleging that 
Verizon was discouraging customers from using its competitor’s 
service in an attempt to maintain a monopoly.52 The Court analyzed 
 
 45. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 
(2004). 
 46. Id. at 408–10. 
 47. Id. at 402. Because of the significant costs associated with establishing the 
telecommunication infrastructure, incumbent local exchange carriers enjoyed a monopoly in 
their respective service areas prior to the passage of the Telecommunications Act of 1996. Id.  
 48. The Act provided that incumbent local exchange carriers (LEC’s) had to allow any 
communication carrier access to their network which would allow competitors the ability to 
provide telecommunication services and compete with the incumbent carrier. 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–104, § 251, 110 Stat. 56, 61–63 (1996) 
(codified in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).  
 49. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 401. The Telecommunication Act of 1996 places a duty on 
telephone companies requiring them to facilitate market entrants. Id. 
 50. Id. at 406–07. 
 51. Id. at 404–05. 
 52. Id. at 406–09. 
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the antitrust claims without regard to the Telecommunications Act, 
as required by the saving clause, and ruled that Verizon was free to 
refuse to deal with their competitors.53 Trinko strengthened the 
assumption that market participants are not expected to help their 
competitors increase market share at their own expense. 
IV. THE COURT’S DECISION IN CHRISTY SPORTS, LLC V. DEER 
VALLEY RESORT CO. 
The Tenth Circuit reasoned that Deer Valley was within its rights 
to include the restrictive covenant on the sale of the land at the mid-
mountain village.54 Resort owners are free to choose which ancillary 
services to provide their customers and which services to allow third 
parties to provide.55 Further, the court ruled that even after fifteen 
years of not exercising the covenant, Deer Valley was free to exercise 
the covenant even if it resulted in reduced competition on the 
resort.56 Companies operate under a premise that they may refuse to 
deal with others; exceptions to the rule are few, narrow, and not 
present in this case.57 
A. Restrictive Covenants 
Seemingly as a preliminary matter, the court analyzed the 
restrictive covenant under § 2. The court did not find a problem 
with the resort restricting its competitors from providing ancillary 
services on its property.58 Private entities such as theme parks, 
hospitals, universities, and movie theaters can choose to allow third 
parties to provide ancillary services at competitive prices or to be the 
sole provider of such services and enjoy monopoly pricing.59 Ski 
resorts share the same luxury: “[A]llowing resorts to decide for 
 
 53. Id. at 410 (“We conclude that Verizon’s alleged insufficient assistance in the 
provision of service to rivals is not a recognized antitrust claim under this Court’s existing 
refusal-to-deal precedents.”). 
 54. Christy Sports, LLC v. Deer Valley Resort Co., 555 F.3d 1188, 1193 (10th Cir. 
2009). 
 55. Id.  
 56. Id. at 1196. 
 57. Id. at 1194. 
 58. Id. at 1193. 
 59. Id. One trip to the theater’s concession area and monopoly pricing is easily 
understood. The author recently paid nearly $3.00 for a Baby Ruth at one such theater. The 
same Baby Ruth was on sale, 3/$1.00, at the local grocer. 
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themselves what blend of vertical integration and third party 
competition will produce the highest return may well increase 
competition in the ski resort business as a whole, and thus benefit 
consumers.”60 Antitrust law is not concerned with the pricing of 
ancillary services within a resort, but the pricing of a resort’s 
complete package as it competes in a market with other resorts.61  
As in Drury Inn, the restrictive covenant played a significant role 
in inducing Deer Valley to allow its competitors to provide ancillary 
services at the resort. Restrictive covenants may appear to stifle 
competition on the surface, but a more in-depth study reveals that 
they are often an important factor in attracting market entrants, thus 
strengthening competition.62 
B. Revocation of Consent and Refusal to Deal 
Christy Sports’ allegations against Deer Valley hinged on the 
argument that the business relationship they shared with Deer Valley 
fit into the duty to deal exception.63 Christy Sports argued that their 
nearly fifteen-year relationship with Deer Valley was on par with the 
business relationship that bound the parties in Aspen.64  
The court analyzed Christy Sports’ refusal-to-deal claim and the 
Aspen decision on a stage set by Trinko: “[T]he Sherman Act ‘does 
not restrict the long recognized right of [a] trader or manufacturer 
engaged in an entirely private business, freely to exercise his own 
independent discretion as to parties with whom he will deal.’”65 In 
Trinko, the Supreme Court stated that “‘Aspen Skiing is at or near 
the outer boundary of § 2 liability.’”66  
The Christy Sports court distinguished Aspen on the grounds that 
Aspen dealt with the termination of a profitable business relationship 
without justification and that Christy Sports did not.67 The larger 
owner in Aspen declined to accept retail price from the continued 
cooperative efforts of his competitor, presumably in an effort to force 
 
 60. Id. at 1195. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 1196. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 1194 (quoting Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 
LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 408 (2004)).  
 66. Id. at 1197 (quoting Trinko, 540 U.S. at 409). 
 67. Id. 
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his competition to exit the market and then enjoy monopoly 
power.68 Deer Valley, in contrast, did not enjoy a profitable 
relationship with Christy Sports; since 1995, Christy Sports had not 
imparted any portion of its ski rental revenues to Deer Valley.69 Their 
relationship did not rise to the level of the business relationship in 
Aspen, and Deer Valley was not liable for creating or attempting to 
create a monopoly by refusing to deal with Christy Sports.70 
V. THE TENTH CIRCUIT SHOULD HAVE APPLIED A PREDATORY 
PRICING ANALYSIS RATHER THAN THE BUSINESS RELATIONSHIP 
RULES 
Although the Tenth Circuit reached the correct decision in 
Christy Sports, its analysis fails to explicitly discuss predatory practices 
and does not provide a clear framework for lower courts to follow. 
Rather than perpetuating the business relationship reasoning found 
in Aspen, which is vague and offers little guidance to lower courts, 
the Tenth Circuit’s decision would have delivered a more useful 
standard if it had introduced a predatory behavior analysis. As a well-
established framework, predatory analysis would have resulted in a 
clearer decision in Christy Sports and a more established and concrete 
standard for lower courts to use in deciding future refusal-to-deal 
cases.  
The Trinko Court sent a loud, clear signal that predatory analysis 
is appropriate in refusal-to-deal cases. Trinko offered indirect 
predatory analysis in its discussion of Aspen when the Court claimed 
that the larger owner’s “course of dealing suggested a willingness to 
forsake short-term profits to achieve an anticompetitive end.”71 
Trinko did not, however, explicitly invite other courts to analyze 
refusal-to-deal cases under a predatory behavior framework. On the 
shoulders of Trinko, the Tenth Circuit should have taken the next 
step to apply direct predatory analysis to the refusal-to-deal issues in 
Christy Sports.  
A company engages in predatory behavior when it foregoes 
profits in the short-term by placing artificial barriers in the 
marketplace in hopes that competitors will not be able to keep 
 
 68. See discussion supra Part III.B. 
 69. Supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
 70. Id. at 1197. 
 71. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 409. 
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pace.72 When competitors are forced to exit the market, the predator 
is able to exercise monopoly power by charging artificially high 
prices, supracompetitive prices, to recoup the losses it incurred while 
pricing predatorily and then enjoy increased profits in a market 
without competition.73 
A. In Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 
the United States Supreme Court Formalized a Two-Pronged Test for 
Analyzing Liability in Predatory Pricing Cases 
Brooke Group, a cigarette manufacturer, accused a competitor, 
Brown & Williamson, of engaging in predatory pricing in the market 
for generic cigarettes in violation of § 2.74 Brooke Group claimed 
that Brown & Williamson was selling generic cigarettes at a loss by 
setting its retail price below the cost of producing them.75 According 
to Brooke Group, Brown & Williamson intentionally employed 
predatory pricing to pressure Brooke Group to raise its prices to 
compensate for lower sales volume as consumers flocked to the lower 
priced option, ultimately forcing Brooke Group to exit the market.76  
The Court established a two-pronged test for recovering under a 
predatory pricing claim: First, the rival’s prices must be “below an 
appropriate measure of [the] rival’s costs,”77 and second, the rival 
must have a “dangerous probability[] of recouping its investment in 
below-cost pric[ing].”78  
Brooke Group satisfied the first prong by proving Brown & 
Williamson priced its generic cigarettes below the cost of producing 
them but ultimately failed to recover because it was not able to 
 
 72. Id. (citing Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 608, 
610–11 (1985)). Forsaking short-term profits to manipulate the price of goods in a way that 
forces competitors to exit the market in order to later reap supracompetitive profits is the 
epitome of predatory behavior. See Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber 
Co., 549 U.S. 312, 318 (2007); Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 
509 U.S. 209, 225 (1993); WILLIAM C. HOLMES, ANTITRUST LAW HANDBOOK § 3:14 
Predatory Pricing; Bundled Discounts (2008); Phillip Areeda & Donald Turner, Predatory 
Pricing and Related Practices Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697, 698 
(1975). 
 73. Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 225; see also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio 
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588–89 (1986). 
 74. 509 U.S. at 222–28. 
 75. Id. at 216. 
 76. Id. at 217. 
 77. Id. at 222. 
 78. Id. at 224. 
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establish that Brown & Williamson was capable of “recouping its 
investment in below-cost pric[ing].”79 
The Brooke Group Court advised that findings of liability should 
be rare and that “the costs of an erroneous finding of liability are 
high” because 
[T]he mechanism by which a firm engages in predatory pricing—
lowering prices—is the same mechanism by which a firm stimulates 
competition; because “cutting prices in order to increase business 
often is the very essence of competition . . . [;] mistaken inferences 
. . . are especially costly, because they chill the very conduct the 
antitrust laws are designed to protect.”80 
B. Applying the Brooke Group Test to Other Types of Predatory 
Behavior 
While Brooke Group’s two-pronged test is a staple in predatory 
pricing cases,81 its influence has also been felt in other types of 
predatory cases. In Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardware 
Lumber Co., a § 2 predatory buying case, the United States Supreme 
Court explicitly applied the Brooke Group test.82 Ross-Simmons 
accused Weyerhaeuser of bidding up the price of alder sawlogs, Ross-
Simmons’s main production input.83 Ross-Simmons claimed 
Weyerhaeuser attempted to drive it out of the finished lumber 
market by artificially increasing its production costs in hopes to then 
exert monopsony buying power in the sawlog market.84 The Court 
held that Brooke Group’s predatory pricing test applied to predatory 
buying cases.85  
 
 79. Id. at 222–26. 
 80. Id. at 226 (quoting Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 122 n.17 
(1986)). 
 81. See, e.g., Spirit Airlines, Inc. v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 431 F.3d 917 (6th Cir. 2005); 
Star Fuel Mats, LLC v. Sam’s East, Inc., 362 F.3d 639 (10th Cir. 2004); United States v. 
AMR Corp., 335 F.3d 1109 (10th Cir. 2003); Bathke v. Casey’s Gen. Stores, Inc., 64 F.3d 
340 (8th Cir. 1995). 
 82. 549 U.S. 312 (2007). 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 316. Exerting monopoly power on the buy-side in a market, as was the claim 
in Weyerhaeuser, creates a monopsony, rather than a monopoly. Id. at 320 (citing Roger D. 
Blair & Jeffrey L. Harrison, Antitrust Policy and Monopsony, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 297 
(1991)). 
 85. Id. at 318. 
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The United States Supreme Court also applied the Brooke Group 
test in Pacific Bell Telephone Co. v. Linkline Communications, Inc., a 
§ 2 price-squeeze case.86 In a price-squeeze situation, a predator 
attempts to monopolize a market by squeezing its competitor’s 
profit margins through predatory, unilateral conduct as both 
wholesaler and retailer.87 Predators in this position can apply upward 
pressure on their rivals’ retail prices by increasing the price of inputs 
as the wholesaler; the predator simultaneously applies downward 
pressure by decreasing its own prices as a retailer in the same market, 
effectively squeezing the profit margins of its retail competitors who 
must lower their prices to compete.88 The Court held that price-
squeeze claims are valid, but that to prevail with a price-squeeze 
allegation, a predator must have priced its retail goods at a short-
term loss and have a “dangerous probability” of recouping the losses 
incurred.89 
In a third type of § 2 predatory behavior, predatory bundling, 
the Ninth Circuit applied the Brooke Group test in Cascade Health 
Solutions v. Peacehealth.90 Peacehealth provided three major types of 
hospital services while Cascade offered only two.91 Cascade accused 
Peacehealth of attempting to create a monopoly by offering its 
exclusive hospital care at deep discounts to insurance companies who 
also agreed to use Peacehealth as their sole preferred provider of the 
other two (competitive) types of hospital care.92 Accordingly, profit-
maximizing insurance companies were likely to accept such offers, 
excluding Cascade from the hospital care market and allowing 
Peacehealth to enjoy monopoly power.  
While bundling often benefits consumers, it can be 
disadvantageous when bundling excludes efficient competitors who 
produce a subset of the goods offered by the predator, bundler.93 
The court held that “bundled discounts may not be considered 
exclusionary conduct within the meaning of § 2 . . . unless the 
 
 86. 129 S. Ct. 1109 (2009). 
 87. Id. at 1118. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 1120 (applying the Brooke Group test). 
 90. 502 F.3d 895 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 91. Id. at 902. 
 92. Id. 
 93. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 236 (2d ed. 2001); Barry Nalebuff, 
Exclusionary Bundling, 20 ANTITRUST BULL. 321, 321 (2005).  
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discounts resemble the behavior that the Supreme Court in Brooke 
Group identified as predatory.”94 
C. Refusal to Deal and Christy Sports Analyzed Under the Brooke 
Group Test 
With slight modifications, the Brooke Group test can be the 
standard for predatory, refusal-to-deal cases such as Christy Sports. 
The first prong of the Brooke Group test requires a showing that the 
rival has forfeited short-term profits by instituting below-cost 
pricing. In the refusal-to-deal context, the first prong would require 
a showing that a party has forfeited short-term profits by refusing to 
deal with another market participant. The second prong would be 
virtually unchanged: the complaining party needs to establish that 
the firm who refuses to deal has a “dangerous probability[] of 
recouping its investment in”95 refusing to deal.  
The standard in refusal-to-deal cases, just as with other predatory 
cases, should be high because refusing to deal with competitors, as 
with decreasing prices, is one way firms increase competition in the 
marketplace—often benefiting consumers. Erroneously finding 
liability under antitrust laws for refusing to deal could have the effect 
of “chill[ing] the very conduct the antitrust laws are designed to 
protect.”96 
Introducing the Brooke Group test into the refusal-to-deal arena 
gives courts a definitive framework under which to decide cases and 
provides firms with a more predictable framework under which to 
make business decisions. The Brooke Group test is a more concrete 
standard than the business relationship rule relied on in Christy 
Sports. 
Had the Tenth Circuit substituted a Brooke Group analysis in the 
place of its business-relationship analysis, it would have affirmed the 
district court after considering that, under the first prong, Deer 
Valley had not forfeited short-term profits by refusing to deal with 
Christy Sports (it had been ten years since Deer Valley had received 
 
 94. Cascade Health Solutions, 502 F.3d at 913. 
 95. Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 224 
(1993). 
 96. Id. at 226 (quoting Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 122 n.17 
(1986) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 594 
(1986))). 
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15% of the ski rental revenue).97 Instead, however, by applying a 
business-relationship analysis, the Tenth Circuit had to carefully 
straddle the decisions in Aspen and Trinko.98 Of greatest benefit, 
using the Brooke Group test would have avoided the confusion 
related to both the outer boundary of § 2 liability99 and the hard-to-
define business relationship of competing market participants.100 
If Christy Sports had continued paying Deer Valley a portion of 
its ski rental revenue, it would have likely satisfied the first prong of 
the test because Deer Valley would have forfeited short-term profits 
in refusing to deal. Then, of course, Christy Sports’ success would 
depend on whether it could establish that Deer Valley had a 
dangerous probability of recouping its investment in refusing to deal. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Tenth Circuit should have analyzed Christy Sports under the 
Brooke Group framework to provide lower courts with something 
akin to a freshly-groomed ski path to follow through the thicket of 
antitrust jurisprudence. Indeed, the Tenth Circuit missed the 
opportunity to set a clear standard for refusal-to-deal cases and 
analyzed Christy Sports under the business-relationship framework—
leaving lower courts to find their way through the confusing 
intersection of the Aspen and Trinko decisions. Under Aspen, the 
courts and market participants are left with little guidance in 
determining whether parties have engaged in a business relationship 
such that they fit the narrow exception and are required to deal with 
other firms. By adopting the Brooke Group test, the Tenth Circuit 
would have afforded courts and market participants a clear predatory 




 97. The reason for the discontinuance of payments (15% of the ski rental revenues) from 
Christy Sports to Deer Valley was not revealed in the case. See supra note 15. 
 98. See supra notes 69–74 and accompanying text. 
 99. See Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 
409 (2004) (“Aspen Skiing is at or near the outer boundary of § 2 liability.”). 
 100. See Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985). 
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